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Introduction
The demand for insurance is traditionally explained by the assumptions that insured are risk-averse, whereas insurers are risk-neutral 1 . Risk-neutral customers, however, would not be interested in insuring at a premium that exceeds the expected loss, i.e. the actuarial fair rate. To introduce a numerical example, under the risk-allocation point of view, an insurance that covers an expected loss of 300 and charges a premium of 400 would never be acceptable to a risk-neutral agent.
However, there are some limitations to the explanatory power of the risk-allocation approach. E.g., firms are quite an important group of customers. Ashby/Diacon (1999) point out that firms have a linear rather than a concave yield function and therefore cannot be judged as risk-averse 2 . Goldberg (1990) furthermore argues against the careless usage of the ad-hoc assumption of risk-aversion in institutional economics, because it keeps the focus away from other useful insights which might be better able to explain firms' behavior, such as specific investments.
There is a growing literature that analyzes why risk-neutral agents, in particular firms, might be interested in buying insurance even at a premium above the fair rate, or invest in risk-management. Insurance does not only cover risks, but also provides other services, such as evaluation of risky situations or the professional handling of settlements 3 . With respect to risk-neutral insurance customers, a new branch of literature seems to establish.
In this paper, I introduce another reason why risk-neutral agents can benefit from insurance. I analyze legal cost insurance as an example for a strategic device that influences the interaction of the insured with other agents 4 . This strategic aspect has not been focussed on yet, hence the paper adds a new contribution to this new branch of insurance literature.
Under the strategic approach, it is not the aspect of risk-allocation that makes legal cost insurance beneficial for potential litigants, but the possibility to improve their strategic position in a law suit. Legal cost insurance has two strategic effects in a game with settlement and trial. First of all, legal cost insurance can make the plaintiff's threat to sue credible even if the case has a negative expected value 5 . The second strategic effect of legal cost insurance is to shift the bargaining range and therefore the settlement result. This effect can make legal cost insurance attractive for both of the litigants even in a positive expected value suit.
Extending the numeric example introduced above might be helpful to explain why taking account of strategic effects may lead to a different result: Assume that litigation costs are 1000, of which the the insured had to bear a deductible of 700 in case of trial. Thus, as in the example above, the insurance covers 300. Let the insurance premium again be 400. If the strategic effect of legal cost insurance leads to a settlement of 500 (whereas without legal cost insurance, the settlement result would be zero), then it is beneficial for a plaintiff to insure even when he is risk-neutral.
Without legal cost insurance in negative expected value cases, the threat to sue would be noncredible, and the potential defendant would not agree to make a positive settlement payment. If, on the other hand, the potential plaintiff is insured, the insurance premium is sunk when the settlement negotiations take place. The idea to turn a negative expected value case into a positive expected value case by distributing the litigation costs over time is due to Bebchuk (1996) . However, he analyzes retainer fees rather than legal cost insurance 6 . Retainers differ from legal cost insurance in two aspects:
• Under the British legal cost allocation rule, a prevailing plaintiff would receive reimbursement for retainer fees, but not for the insurance rate he has paid. Thus, the retainer is not entirely sunk, whereas the insurance premium is sunk.
• Under both the British and the American rule, the retainer and the residual fee add up to the total litigation costs, whereas the sum of insurance premium and deductible do not necessarily add up to the litigation costs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, the equi-librium solution for positive and negative expected value suits is derived. Section 4 presents the main results and discusses briefly the impact of some modifications of the assumptions I made.
The model
Consider two risk-neutral players, P and D, that engage in a dangerous activity. For example, P is a pedestrian, D a driver; the latter might cause an accident that harms the former. The interaction takes place in three stages:
• The insurance stage: P and D simultaneously decide whether to buy a legal cost insurance or not.
• The accident stage: An accident might occur at probability γ, which causes harm to P, who values not having to suffer this harm with X.
• The litigation stage If an accident has occured, the parties negotiate on a settlement. If they reach an agreement, the game ends with a payment S from D to P. If the parties do not reach an agreement, P has to decide whether to proceed to trial or not. In case of trial, the judge decides with probability π in favor of P.
Figure 1 represents these three stages graphically. The tree starts at the bottom with the decision of the parties whether to insure or not. Since this decision takes place simultaneously, the two decision nodes of D are within one information set, which is indicated by a dashed line between these two nodes.
The insurance stage leads to four possible combinations of decisions. f > 0 is the insurance premium (and assumed to be positive, since the insurance company needs to cover at least the marginal costs of contracting). e = f denotes the decision of P to insure and g = f represents the decision of D to buy insurance. e = 0 and g = 0 stand for the decision of P or D, respectively, not to purchase insurance. To simplify figure 1, three of the subgames that arise out of the insurance stage have been eliminated, as it is indicated by the dashed box. Thus, figure 1 shows the accident and litigation stages only for one of these four branches, namely the combination e = f and g = 0 (where only P is insured) 7 .
The accident stage is represented by the box labelled with "A". In one case no accident occurs with probability 1 − γ; 0 < γ < 1 and the game ends 8 . Due to the assumed risk-neutrality, P is not interested in buying a risk-insurance to cover the accident loss (at least not at a fair rate). 
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Alternatively, in the case of an accident (with probability γ), the parties enter the litigation stage. The parties have no means to influence γ. This assumption excludes any precautionary effect on the insurance decision.
First, the parties negotiate on a settlement. These negotiations are represented by the box labelled with the word "settlement". If the bargaining range, denoted as R, is nonempty, the parties reach a settlement, and the game ends with a payment S ∈ R from D to P. To keep matters as simple as possible and to focus on the strategic impact of insurance, I assume settlement under perfect and complete information and neglect problems like asymmetric information or divergent expectations 9 . If, and only if, the bargaining range is empty, P has to decide whether to proceed to trial or not.
In case of trial, the plaintiff P faces litigation costs that are denoted as c(e), where e ∈ {0; f }. If P is uninsured (e = 0), he has to pay the full costs c(0). If he is insured (e = f ), he only has to bear a deductible c(f ) which is non-negative:
The trial costs of the defendant D are respectively denoted as c(g) with c(0) being the full costs and c(f ) the deductible 10 .
P prevails in trial with probability π, 0 < π < 1, which is assumed to be independent of the insurance decisions of the parties. Hence, the expected payoff of P from proceeding to trial is πX minus the trial costs c(e) minus the insurance premium e he has paid in advance. D's expected payoff in case of a trial is −πX − c(g) − g (recall that in the example subgame presented in figure 1 , g is zero). If P does not proceed to trial, the parties only have to bear their insurance premiums, if they have bought an insurance during the first stage.
I assume that the insurance premium covers one period and that γ is the probability of an accident during this period. Furthermore, I assume that the parties have the same expectations concerning the probabilities γ and π.
Equlibrium analysis
In this section, the game of figure 1 is solved by backward induction. I first analyze the litigation stage, which consists of settlement negotiations and, if settlement fails, the decision of the plaintiff whether to proceed to trial or not. As the solution concept for the settlement negotiation, I use the Nash bargaining solution, assuming zero bargaining costs and equal bargaining power.
The solution of the litigation stage depends on two factors: First, the parties' decisions during the insurance stage, and second, whether the case has a negative or a positive expected value. Using the results of the litigation stage, I present the insurance stage as a reduced game form and derive parameter ranges for the different possible Nash equilibria for both the negative and the positive expected value case.
The litigation stage
If settlement negotiations fail, P will proceed to trial if, and only if, the expected payoff of the trial is positive. This payoff comprises the expected judgement πX minus the trial costs of P, c(e). Hence, P will try the case if, and only if, c(e) < πX. The expected net value of the decision of P to proceed to trial is πX − c(e) for P and −[πX + c(g)] for D. If P does not proceed to trial, the value of this decision is zero for both of the parties.
P will proceed to trial if, and only if, the value of this decision exceeds the value of the decision not to proceed, hence if πX − c(e) > 0. In this case, his threat to try the case is credible. If, however, D expects that P will not proceed to trial, then this threat is called non-credible. Now define
• πX > c(0) as positive expected value case,
• πX < c(0) as negative expected value case, and
• c(f ) < πX as the Credibility Condition.
This allows to derive the first result of this paper: The Nash bargaining solution requires to derive the settlement range, denoted as R. This is determined by the trial decision of P. He will only accept settlement payments S that exceed the value of his decision, namely 11 :
(e) πX − c(e) : πX > c(e)
If P credibly threats to proceed to trial, he will only accept settlement payments that exceed the (positive) net expected value of the trial 12 . If, on the other hand, his threat to proceed is non-credible he would accept any positive settlement payment. D anticipates the trial decision of P and will only accept to make settlement payments that hold
−S ≥ 0 : πX < c(e) −πX − c(g) : πX > c(e)
Hence, if D expects that P proceeds to trial, he would agree to make any settlement payment that is smaller than his expected loss from trial, S < πX + c(g). If, on the other hand, he expects P not to proceed, D will not agree to make a positive settlement payment. From these considerations, the settlement range (which is limited by the parties' threat points) can be derived:
(e), πX + c(g)] : πX > c(e) ∅ : πX < c(e)

If πX > c(e) holds, the parties reach a settlement with S ∈ [πX − c(e), πX + c(g)].
If, on the other hand, πX < c(e) holds, neither a settlement nor a trial will take place. The latter case is equivalent to a settlement with a zero payment: none of the parties receives or pays anything, and the game ends. Hence, this case will be treated as if S = 0.
11 Note that this expression is conditioned on c(e), with e ∈ {0; f }, whereas the definition of the negative and the positive expected value cases is contingent on c(0). For simplification, I do not discuss cases of indifference. 12 For simplicity, I assume that a settlement offer is also acceptable if it equals the threat point.
Obviously, the credibility of the threat to sue determines whether or not the parties agree upon a positive settlement payment 13 . From Proposition 1 it follows that, in negative expected value cases, legal cost insurance that obeys the Credibility Condition motivates D to make a positive settlement offer. The insurance decreases the costs a plaintiff has to bear in case of trial, whereas the insurance premium is sunk when the plaintiff has to make his trial decision. Hence it is only the deductible that is relevant when P has to make this decision with regard to the trial.
Under the assumption of equal bargaining power and zero bargaining costs, the Nash bargaining solution leads to the arithmetic mean of the parties' threat points as settlement payments. A legal cost insurance contract consists of the insurance premium and the deductible or the amount that is covered, hence each possible legal cost insurance contract can be described by the parameters [f, c(f )].
To simplify the notation, I define a variable h that makes the following results more handy:
The share of a party's litigation costs that is coverd by the legal cost insurance then is 2h. Taking into account the effect of negative expected value suits and assuming that legal cost insurance obeys the Credibility Condition, the possible settlement results, denoted as as S(e, g) with e, g ∈ {0; f }, are:
holds: the settlement result is πX if neither or if both of the parties is insured. If only the plaintiff is insured, this would increase the settlement result, whereas it is smaller if only the defendant is insured.
In negative expected value cases S(f, 0) > S(f, f ) > S(0, 0) = S(0, f ) holds: if the defendant is not insured, the settlement result will be zero. Being the only one who is insured leads to the highest settlement result for the plaintiff. If both parties are insured, the settlement result is πX, just as in a positive expected value case.
13 See Nalebuff (1988, 198) .
Hence, the positive and the negative expected value cases lead to different outcomes if the plaintiff is not insured. This difference has an impact on the analysis of the insurance stage in the subsequent section.
The insurance stage 3.2.1 The decision situation
In the insurance stage the parties decide on the values of e and g. The payoffs of the subgames that follow this stage depend on these decisions: P expects to receive X − e if no accident occurs (with probability 1 − γ), and S(e, g) − e in case an accident has occured (with probability γ). His optimal insurance decision is 
Positive expected value cases
First consider the positive expected value case. Table 1 shows the insurance stage as a 2x2 game. The strategies of P (e = 0 means not to insure, e = f denotes the decision for insurance) are presented on the left column of table 1, whereas the strategies of D (g = 0 for no insurance, g = f for insurance) can be found in the first row.
The equilibrium analysis of this game leads to the following result:
Proposition 2: In a positive expected value case, the strategy combination
is a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies if, and only if, f < γh and the Credibility Condition holds.
If the legal cost insurance premium (which is exogenously given) is too low, the parties are in a prisoners' dilemma situation: It is individually rational to insure, because this improves the bargaining result, but if both parties are insured, the settlement payment is just the same as between uninsured parties 14 . 
Since the game only concerns the payoff to P and D (whereas the insurer is not taken into account), this Nash equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient. If, on the other hand, the legal cost insurance premium is sufficiently high, namely f > γh, then the strategy combination (e = 0, g = 0) is the Nash equilibrium, which is Pareto-efficient.
Negative expected value cases
The insurance stage in the negative expected value case is represented in table 2. 
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To the left hand side of the vertical line, the Credibility Condition is fulfilled.
Legal cost insurance contracts with [f, c(f ) ] combination between the diagonal lines in figure 2 and left of the vertical line would implement the strategy combination (e = f, g = 0) as the Nash equilibrium. [f, c(f )] combinations above the upper diagonal line and on the right hand side of the vertical line would implement (e = 0, g = 0). If the legal cost insurance contracts consist of parameter constellation above the horizontal line, but below the lower diagonal line, then the insurance stage game would have no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (indicated as "no NE"). Below the horizontal and to the left of the vertical line, (e = f, g = f ) would be implemented.
15 Proof of Proposition 3:
• If f > γ(πX + h), then e = 0 is the dominant strategy for P; g = 0 is always the best answer of D on this. Hence, regardless of D's best answer on e = f , the Nash equilibrium is (e = 0, g = 0), q.e.d.
• If f > γh, then g = 0 is the dominant strategy of D; with γ(πX + h) > f , the best answer of P is e = f . Hence, regardless of P's best answer on g = f , the Nash equilibrium is (e = f, g = 0), q.e.d.
• If f < min{γh; γπX}, which implies f < γ(πX + h), the strategy e = f is dominant for P and the best answer of D would be g = f . Hence, regardless of D's best answer on e = 0, the Nash equilibrium is (e = f, g = f ), q.e.d.
Note that the insurance game would have multiple Nash equilibria, if the above conditions did not hold strictly. E.g., with f = γ(πX + h), the game has two Nash equilibria, namely e = 0, g = 0 and e = f, g = 0. 16 As presented here, figure 2 represents the case of extraordinary high trial costs, namely c(0) > 3πX.
If this condition does not hold, then the dashed horizontal line would be above the intersection of the lower diagonal with the vertical line. Hence, under the assumptions made, it is possible to regulate legal cost insurance such that legimate claims lead to positive settlements, but a suboptimal Nash equilibrium in positive expected value cases can be avoided, as well as insurance only for redistributive purposes.
To relax some of the assumptions of the model might lead to different results. E.g., Bebchuk (1984) and (1988) analyzes settlement under imcomplete information -in these models the plaintiff can hope for a positive settlement even in negative expected value cases 17 . It is assumed that legal cost insurance covers the litigation costs minus the deductible. This implicitly assumes that no renegotiation between the plaintiff and the insurance company takes place before (or during) trial. To allow for renegotiations would of course alter the strategic effect of legal cost insurance 18 .
On the other hand, it is not crucial which cost allocation rule is valid. To replace the American by the British rule would lead to conditions for Nash Equilibria that allow to derive qualitatively the same results. The same holds for the introduction of different kinds of litigation costs, deductibles, or insurance premiums.
In the model, the insurance contract parameters (premium and deductible) are treated as exogenous and are subject to a comparative static analysis. It would be an interesting next step to treat the insurance company as a player that chooses these parameters in order to maximize its profits, subject to the constraints provided by the equilibrium analysis presented here.
